Ukraine Loses Major Hague Maritime Case Against Russia After Years of Litigation

Between the Scylla of Betrayal and the Charybdis of Ignorance

On June 15, an international arbitral tribunal in The Hague issued a press release announcing its final award in the case concerning the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Russia’s actions in the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, and the Kerch Strait.

The proceedings began in 2017. Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for managing the case. For a long time, the public face of Ukraine’s legal effort was Olena Zerkal, a figure highly regarded by Kyiv’s political establishment and much of the progressive media. During the final stages, Ukraine was represented by Anton Korynevych, the Foreign Ministry’s chief legal adviser and another prominent figure within Ukraine’s diplomatic and legal circles.

However, the legal positions in the case were largely prepared by foreign legal consultants, a fact that was never a secret. Ukraine also appointed a foreign national as its arbitrator on the tribunal. For those who have long observed the personnel policies governing this field, the reasons were self-evident. Domestic specialists in maritime law were effectively excluded from the process.

The outcome of the arbitration had appeared increasingly unfavorable since 2021, when the tribunal dismissed a significant portion of Ukraine’s claims on the grounds that they were not based on maritime law.

The final award left Ukraine without any financial compensation and rejected a substantial share of the remaining claims. Among other findings, the tribunal maintained the position that the Sea of Azov constitutes the “internal waters of two states,” a conclusion that enabled it to dismiss numerous Ukrainian claims relating to navigation and shipping.

The tribunal found Russia in violation of only several provisions of the Convention — Articles 123, 192, 194, 205, and 206 — in connection with the construction of the Kerch Bridge, pipelines, and cables crossing the strait. These violations concerned failures to cooperate on environmental protection and the non-disclosure of relevant environmental information.

That was the extent of the tribunal’s findings.

Naturally, viewed from today’s perspective, Ukraine’s 2016 claims evoke a sense of nostalgia. Ukraine now possesses new capabilities and instruments for protecting its maritime interests beyond filing complaints before international tribunals.

Yet there remain institutions, offices, and bureaucratic structures where little has changed over the past decade. The core problem is that documents concerning Ukraine’s maritime policy continue to be drafted by foreign consultants and approved by the same diplomatic figures and academic bureaucrats who have dominated the field for years.

A second problem is that the influence of what many observers describe as an entrenched international fishing-industry lobby has not disappeared. For decades, sector officials were sustained by these networks, whose interests found their way into Ukraine’s maritime doctrine. Those interested can examine current controversies surrounding the financing of Ukraine’s Antarctic activities and the alleged Belarusian and Tajik connections that originated in fishing fleets and fish-processing enterprises, only to reappear today in border logistics hubs and opaque renewable-energy projects.

At present, it is difficult to imagine any consequences for those involved in this case beyond generous bonuses and attractive foreign assignments.

History, however, often operates on a much longer timeline.

Borys Babin

EMPR