Interview with Ruslan Muzychuk, spokesperson for the National Guard of Ukraine, on unit readiness, training, modernization, and countering disinformation during and after the war.
March 26 marks the Day of the National Guard of Ukraine. In its modern form, this military formation with law enforcement functions within the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was restored on March 13, 2014, after the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
Since then, National Guard units have been carrying out tasks to protect state sovereignty and territorial integrity, guard important state facilities, and strengthen public safety. After the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the guardsmen, together with other components of the Defense Forces, have been taking part in combat operations, defending Ukrainian cities, and carrying out special missions on various sections of the front.
Ukrinform spoke with the spokesperson for the National Guard of Ukraine, Ruslan Muzychuk, about the role of the National Guard in countering Russian aggression, the combat work of its units, and the challenges faced by the guardsmen during the war.
OUR UNITS WERE INVOLVED IN ALL KEY DIRECTIONS
— What were the main tasks performed by the National Guard during the full-scale war?
— It is important to understand that the National Guard is part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and, in addition to its military role, has a significant law enforcement component. As for the military component, during the legal regime of martial law most of our units are subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and carry out tasks to repel armed aggression. From the first hours of the full-scale invasion, our units were involved in repelling the attack on Hostomel Airport and also operated in Donetsk and Luhansk regions as well as in the South — wherever the enemy attempted to advance.
These are essentially the same tasks our units carried out during the Joint Forces Operation. We all remember 2022 — Mariupol, when our brigade stationed there and the Azov unit carried out tasks to hold both the city itself and Azovstal. Later came the counteroffensives, including the Slobozhanskyi counteroffensive, where our units took part in pushing the enemy out of positions and clearing territories, particularly in the Kherson region.
As for the law enforcement component, from the very first hours and days the National Guard deployed its servicemen to strengthen security in cities. This included checkpoints, as we remember the large number of attempted infiltrations by sabotage and reconnaissance groups — both in the Kharkiv region and in Kyiv. We also strengthen security during the curfew.
Another area of our activity is guarding critical infrastructure facilities and important state sites. Currently, this work has an additional dimension related to threats from the air: we not only strengthen security at the facilities themselves but also respond to enemy attempts to carry out aerial strikes.
— In which major operations were National Guard units involved?
— The first was the battles for Hostomel Airport. The fact that the enemy failed to capture it in the first hours of the full-scale invasion and could not use it for its intended purpose — landing aircraft, ensuring logistics, and bringing in additional units that could have advanced on the capital — was extremely important. Our fighters engaged in battle from the very first hours. They destroyed six helicopters. Let me remind you that more than 30 helicopters were involved in the assault in the first hours alone. The runway was also significantly damaged, which prevented the enemy from landing their aircraft. As a result, the tempo of the offensive on the capital was lost.
The enemy was forced to stretch its forces and switch to defense. Units of the Defense Forces not only stopped the enemy but also inflicted significant losses on them from the very first days.
As for the offensive on Kharkiv, on the first day National Guard servicemen destroyed enemy tanks on the approaches to the city. The 5th Slobozhanska Brigade, the 3rd Operational Brigade of the National Guard, and the Omega special unit also carried out tasks in the Kharkiv defense zone, which brought significant results. Later, they were involved in the counteroffensive.
Mariupol should also be mentioned separately. A significant share of tasks was carried out on the Zaporizhzhia axis as well. There, the enemy actively used aviation, and a considerable number of their aircraft were destroyed. In particular, a guardsman known by the call sign “Zaporizhzhia Avenger,” one of the youngest Heroes of Ukraine at the time, operated in that area — a fighter who at the age of 19 shot down more than six enemy aircraft.
— What role did the National Guard play in stabilizing the situation in certain areas?
— Overall, during the full-scale invasion our brigades, special forces units, and unmanned systems units were involved in all key directions.
Speaking about 2025, this includes not only carrying out missions in difficult sectors, particularly the Pokrovsk, Kramatorsk, Kostiantynivka, Ocheretyne, and Kupiansk directions, as well as operations in the South. It also includes successful strike-and-search operations. One of them was conducted by units of the National Guard’s 2nd Corps “Khartiia” to relieve the blockade of Kupiansk.
Also, from the end of the summer of 2025, when the National Guard’s 1st Corps “Azov” took over the defense line in the Ocheretyne direction, the Defense Forces carried out a successful strike-and-search operation in the area of Dobropillia. At that time, eight settlements that the enemy had attempted to take control of were liberated. This made it possible to hold Dobropillia itself and to contain further enemy advances.
It is also worth mentioning the tasks carried out in the Pokrovsk direction, particularly the defense of Pokrovsk, Rodynske, and Hryshyne — a significant share of this work was also performed by National Guard units.
AFTER THE WARMING, ENEMY ACTIVITY MAY INCREASE
— How does the nature of combat operations change depending on the season?
— There is a certain dynamic depending on the time of year. With the arrival of favorable weather conditions, warming temperatures, and the disappearance of snow, the condition of roads and soil improves. The enemy, of course, takes advantage of this and becomes more active. An example is the intensification of offensives in the spring of last year and the year before, when in northern Kharkiv region the enemy attempted to break through in the areas of Hlyboke, Lukyantsi, and Vovchansk in May 2024. As the snow disappeared and foliage appeared, the enemy tried to use these conditions, in particular deploying armored vehicles and conducting mechanized assaults.
As for summer, during the past years of the full-scale invasion it has always been a period of active and heavy fighting.
In autumn, both last year and the year before, even with the onset of colder weather, sometimes still in November when conditions allowed, the enemy carried out intense and sometimes desperate assaults — using large numbers of personnel or systematically trying to break through certain sections of the front, constantly replenishing losses and building up forces and equipment.
In winter, different dynamics can also be observed. Even this winter there were periods of decline: at the end of January and the beginning of February the pace of combat operations was noticeably lower, but later it increased again.
Weather conditions directly affect the situation. Not only the season matters, but also the specific weather. For example, during fog or heavy precipitation the use of drones becomes significantly more difficult, while at such times artillery becomes more active — for it, fog essentially makes little difference.
— How do you assess the balance of forces between your side and the enemy?
— Figures regarding the number of enemy personnel in the occupied territories or in border areas are periodically announced, sometimes even for specific directions. I would prefer not to name exact numbers, because there are actually many of them, and such information can sometimes be perceived as a threat, although our units and brigades deal with this threat every day and on a constant basis.
Despite the fact that in some directions their numerical superiority is many times greater, they do not achieve the success and advances envisaged by classical military doctrines. This is ensured by “kill zones” and the large number of drones. For example, recently more than 1,800 enemy drones were recorded in the air at the same time within the area of responsibility of our National Guard’s 1st Corps “Azov.” In addition, there are fiber-optic drones that cannot be detected by electronic intelligence systems because they do not use radio frequencies. We also use a large number of drones, as well as mining the terrain, which plays a major role in our defense.
It is precisely this work — detecting enemy drones and engineering fortifications, carried out together with the Defense Forces — that deprives the enemy of surprise, success, and major achievements.
The enemy constantly replenishes its units: even taking into account the losses reported in the General Staff’s briefings (on average more than 1,000 personnel per day), it tries to reinforce difficult directions. The number of combat engagements sometimes exceeds 200 per day. However, at this stage of the war, the number of enemy infantry does not determine its success in a particular direction.
There are sections of the front where the enemy may outnumber our forces five or even ten times, and sometimes also have superiority in artillery or drones. However, this advantage is not lasting thanks to the actions of our units: the strengthening of unmanned systems and the use of long-range artillery, for example the Bohdana and Zuzana self-propelled artillery systems — 155-mm artillery with a firing range of more than 30 kilometers. This makes it possible to strike concentrations of enemy forces, their logistics, and command posts, and even the loss of control at the tactical level prevents the enemy from properly preparing for offensive operations.
— How has the situation in the National Guard’s area of responsibility changed in recent months?
— As for the Pokrovsk direction, the enemy has not reduced its activity. It is also actively operating in the Ocheretyne and Huliaipole directions. We understand that after the weather warms up, enemy activity in other areas may also increase. As for Kharkiv region and Kupiansk, for example, after the strike-and-search operation the enemy lost the initiative. However, given the enemy’s plans regarding Kupiansk, which we have been observing for more than a year, there may be attempts to resume combat operations in the Kupiansk direction or more broadly in the South Slobozhanskyi area. But we are ready for this.
— How much has the intensity of combat operations for National Guard units increased recently?
— Since the beginning of the year, the intensity of combat operations has remained roughly at the same level as in December 2025, which may be related to the winter period. Activity in the area of responsibility of our corps and brigades was quite high at the end of the summer — in August — as well as during the autumn period, when in many directions in the Donetsk region and even in the Kharkiv region the enemy carried out active assault operations.
— In which directions is the greatest pressure on National Guard units observed today?
— In recent weeks, the greatest pressure has been observed in the Kostiantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Ocheretyne directions, where our brigades repel more than ten, and sometimes more than 20, enemy assault attempts every day. There is also pressure in the Lyman and Kostiantynivka directions, where there are periods of relative calm, but sometimes also escalations.
DRONES HELP NEUTRALIZE THE ENEMY’S NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE
— How does the use of drones and modern technologies affect the effectiveness of the National Guard’s actions?
— Thanks to drones, we, like the Defense Forces in general, are now able to neutralize the enemy’s numerical advantage, particularly in infantry. In addition, Ukraine, and specifically the National Guard’s unmanned systems units, are innovators in many areas of drone warfare.
Over the past year, the use of drones by our units alone in certain directions has increased approximately three to five times. In other words, the number of drones used in a brigade’s defensive sector in difficult directions, such as the Pokrovsk axis, is now three to five times higher than it was last year.
As for the enemy’s drone activity, the key task is countering it. This involves the development of our electronic intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities, as well as the development of interceptor drones. A significant number of enemy reconnaissance drones are constantly present in the air, and our units actively destroy them. During the period of intensive operations against enemy drones such as the Zala, SuperCam, and Orlan types, more than 13,000 have been destroyed.
The National Guard’s unmanned systems units are also among the most effective within the Defense Forces — including Lasar’s Group, the Omega Wings, and Typhoon units. They have inflicted significant losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment — amounting to more than $19 billion. This has helped at least stabilize the situation in certain difficult sectors and create the conditions for strike-and-search operations and for holding occupied positions.
— What results have the National Guard’s unmanned systems units achieved in destroying enemy equipment?
— The greatest results in destroying enemy armored vehicles were achieved in 2022–2024, when the enemy actively used mechanized assaults.
Overall, guardsmen have destroyed more than 20,000 units of various armored vehicles precisely thanks to unmanned systems units. As for the destruction of enemy personnel and the detection of armored vehicles on the battlefield, more than 80 percent — and sometimes even over 90 percent — of targets are struck by drones.
An example of the effective work of unmanned systems units was an operation in mid-April last year in the area of responsibility of the 14th Brigade “Chervona Kalyna” in the Pokrovsk direction, when the enemy attempted an offensive using more than 100 pieces of equipment, including motorcycles, and more than 200 servicemen.
The attack was stopped and repelled, and most of the enemy’s forces and assets were destroyed within seven hours. Despite the high tempo of the assault and the attempt to achieve surprise, timely detection and precise drone operations made it possible to repel the massive attack in less than a day.
— How is the enemy’s use of drones changing?
— We see that the enemy is allocating significant funding to develop its military-industrial complex, particularly for drones. Much of what they do is copied from our experience, scaled up, and applied in practice, which makes them dangerous not only for Ukraine but also for other European countries. At present, only Ukraine has real experience of conducting combat operations with the large-scale use of drones directly on the battlefield; other countries are studying this experience and may integrate it into their own training.
Russia is scaling up its unmanned systems units, increasing the number of production facilities and the use of drones. The emergence of new models and the widespread use of cheap drones such as the “Molniya” make the front line quite dangerous. For example, in the Pokrovsk direction there are cases when the enemy uses about 200 Molniya drones per day. A large portion of them can be shot down by interceptor drones or forced to land by electronic warfare systems, but if 20–50 Molniya drones reach their targets, this creates a serious threat together with guided aerial bombs and artillery.
The enemy continues to develop this component by deploying more technologically advanced models, so we are working to better understand its forces and resources.
— Does the National Guard have solutions or approaches in the use of UAVs that provide an advantage over the enemy?
— The National Guard has its own workshops where drones are produced and existing UAVs are modified so that they can withstand the enemy’s electronic warfare systems and carry out missions in the required directions. This also involves the exchange of experience with manufacturers, including Ukrainian ones, who are doing significant work to ensure that drones are effective on the line of contact. It is not only about the number of drones, but also about ensuring that they successfully perform their tasks — whether strike missions, reconnaissance, or logistics.
MORE THAN 500 “SHAHEDS” HAVE BEEN DESTROYED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR
— What role does the National Guard play in protecting critical infrastructure?
— When it comes to critical infrastructure, this is one of the components of the hybrid war that Russia is waging against Ukraine. This winter showed that energy facilities and other infrastructure, on which heating and power supply for cities and settlements depend, are becoming targets for the enemy. Almost every time a large-scale air attack or targeted strikes occur, our servicemen from mobile fire groups, as well as crews operating interceptor drones, destroy a significant number of drones and sometimes even cruise missiles.
As for ballistic targets, we do not have the means to intercept them, and this is not the task of the National Guard. However, the work of shooting down drones and “Shahed” UAVs is being carried out quite successfully. Since the beginning of this year alone, more than 500 Shahed drones have been destroyed. For comparison, 243 were shot down in 2024. This shows that effectiveness is increasing, even though the number of strike UAVs used by the enemy is also growing.
— How many fire groups are involved in carrying out these tasks?
— In total, there are about one thousand mobile and stationary fire groups. This number is determined by the scope of tasks, the number of facilities that need protection, and the directions from which Russia can launch attacks. Ukraine has a long border with Russia in the north and east, as well as a direction from the maritime area. Therefore, in border areas and in places where enemy aerial targets may potentially appear, we try to respond as effectively as possible.
Geographically, the number of groups can change; sometimes it is increased in certain directions to strengthen the country’s air defense system. Exact numbers and locations are not disclosed for security reasons. The task of the state leadership and the National Guard command is to analyze where and how mobile fire groups should be reinforced and with what means.
In particular, last week an agreement was signed under which, with German financing, National Guard units will receive 15,000 interceptor drones to engage fast and maneuverable aerial targets, which are also used to protect infrastructure facilities.
THE CORPS SYSTEM SPEEDS UP DECISION-MAKING ON THE FRONT
— What does the National Guard’s transition to a corps-level command system involve?
— We currently have two well-known corps: “Azov” and “Khartiia.” They are a little over a year old. In fact, this was when the National Guard transitioned to a corps-level command system.
First of all, this is about shortening the chain of command. Our brigades are directly subordinated to the National Guard corps. At the same time, brigades carry out combat missions at their own level, while the corps perform command and coordination functions — it is not about micromanagement.
Brigades are responsible for holding defensive sectors and ensuring the fulfillment of tasks, including logistics and intelligence, so that the units within the corps operate effectively. Over the past year we have already seen the effectiveness of this system, particularly during strike-and-search operations in the Kupiansk direction and in the area of Dobropillia.
Another aspect is the speed of decision-making. Brigade commanders quickly interact with corps command, which significantly accelerates the adoption of necessary decisions. In the difficult conditions of the front, during sudden offensives, minutes and hours can be decisive — for reinforcing units, delivering ammunition, or regrouping forces.
Organizational and staffing changes are currently underway within the corps to strengthen the units. In particular, the creation of a drone systems regiment and an assault regiment within each corps has been announced. This provides corps commanders with additional tools to reinforce units in difficult sectors within their areas of responsibility.
Another important area is recruitment. Considerable efforts are being made to attract motivated citizens. People know our brigades, corps, and commanders, and this influences their decision to join the units, which in turn strengthens and develops them.
Over the past year, significant work has also been done to expand the ability of units to carry out independent procurement. In particular, they have been connected to the DOT-Chain Defence weapons marketplace and can independently purchase the FPV drones, bomber drones, fixed-wing drones, and electronic warfare systems they need. This shortens the logistics chain and reduces reliance on centralized supply distribution.
In addition, this affects the training system for servicemen. We flexibly and quickly adjust basic military training programs, taking into account frontline needs and the recommendations of commanders who see the real situation on the battlefield.
— How quickly are decisions made today at the unit level in combat conditions?
— Decisions are made quite rapidly, not only at the unit level but also at the corps and National Guard command level under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The commander and the Minister of Internal Affairs regularly visit units on the front line, meeting with brigade commanders, soldiers, and corps commanders. This enables them to clearly understand unit needs, the situation at the front, and determine what managerial or organizational changes are required to ensure units receive everything necessary.
— What approaches are used for recruiting and reinforcing units under intense combat conditions?
— Our corps, “Azov” and “Khartiya,” along with their brigades, have significant media presence due to effective task performance. Many service members and commanders are featured in the media, which contributes to recruitment.
Additionally, we collaborate with all job search platforms, as the Defense Forces have many vacancies. These are not only infantry and assault positions or UAV operators, but also radio operators, analysts, medics, clerks, and psychologists. This helps attract people with the necessary skills for effective unit staffing.
Reinforcement of National Guard units largely depends on mobilization. Training is conducted both in Ukraine and abroad — in more than 10 EU countries and the United States. This increases the number of trained service members available for deployment to the front line.
— What is the situation with personnel rotation in the National Guard?
— It should be understood that as long as active combat continues and the front line exceeds 1,300 kilometers, rotation can only occur when there is a reserve of units available for replacement. Accordingly, this depends on recruitment and mobilization. If recruitment into units remains high and units are regularly reinforced through mobilization, and no escalations occur on new or existing fronts, then planned rotations can be considered.
Now, since our task is not only to hold the defense but also to reinforce other dangerous directions and conduct strike-and-search operations, we cannot allow an entire brigade — or even a battalion or tactical group — to be withdrawn for rest or recovery, at least on a planned basis.
TRAINING PROGRAMS HAVE ALREADY BEEN REISSUED FIVE TIMES
— How has basic training for National Guard servicemembers changed?
— The basic general military training system has been revised many times over the past two years. Training programs have apparently been reissued five times. They are aligned with the Armed Forces’ training to ensure interoperability on the battlefield and are updated according to the demands of modern combat.
Practical training has been strengthened: field exercises now include assaults on trenches and populated areas, and training centers are equipped with simulators for all weapon types, including 120 mm mortars. Training towns and simulators allow for realistic combat scenarios, including the real-time use of drones. One outcome of the reform has been a significant increase in training capacity.
— What new training areas have been added to the program?
— We aim for every servicemember to operate drone systems and understand how both aerial and ground drones are used on the battlefield, as well as how electronic warfare and electronic reconnaissance tools function.
This addition reflects that before the full-scale invasion, training focused mainly on positional combat and urban operations. Now, these skills have new nuances, and even the most experienced special forces soldier may be ineffective or unable to complete tasks in a drone-saturated battlefield.
Training emphasizes not only individual actions and teamwork at the platoon or company level but also integration with a high density of drones on the battlefield. Servicemembers learn to operate independently, detect drones, and coordinate with relevant units.
Additionally, the program includes cyber hygiene lessons. Every soldier carries a phone and must understand which data could be useful to the enemy, what cannot be shared on social media or in conversations, and which information is sensitive. Experienced combat instructors are involved to enhance training effectiveness.
— How is practical training for personnel organized?
— Basic general military training lasts 57 days. During this time, servicemembers receive essential knowledge, ranging from tactical medicine to firearms training. Once they join their unit — usually a brigade — they undergo coordination exercises and specialized training according to their role, whether as a machine gunner, armored vehicle driver, or UAV operator.
This training also includes familiarization with commanders and the specific front-line sector where the soldier will operate. The nature of missions on the Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, or Kherson directions differs significantly, and unit-level follow-up training ensures operational effectiveness.
— How many National Guard servicemembers have trained abroad?
— Regarding personnel training, more than ten EU countries help prepare our units. In 2025 alone, over 6,000 guardsmen underwent training abroad.
The United Kingdom, Norway, and Germany contributed significantly. This includes not only basic general military training but also leadership courses, staff training, sniper and combat medic preparation — essentially the full spectrum needed for a unit to operate effectively.
— How is in-country training for servicemembers developing?
— Training is evolving. Over the past two years, our domestic capabilities have increased nearly sixfold. The program is continuously refined: unit commanders and leadership coordinate with the National Guard Main Directorate and the General Staff, making necessary adjustments. This process happens quickly, as the priority is effectiveness rather than bureaucracy.
WE GET TIRED, LIKE EVERYONE ELSE, BUT WE FIGHT FOR EVERYONE
— What significant changes have taken place in equipping the National Guard with weapons and equipment?
— In recent years, we have received 155 mm artillery (NATO standard). Its effectiveness has been confirmed on multiple fronts, with reconnaissance drone footage showing precise strikes up to 30 km on enemy equipment concentrations and positions. The introduction of these systems within the corps, including the creation of a separate artillery brigade, allows rapid response and reinforcement of critical front-line sectors. The Separate Artillery Brigade of the National Guard, established just two years ago, now ranks among the top three in target destruction efficiency. Here, precision and professionalism sometimes matter more than the number of rounds fired.
Significant work has also been done to modernize outdated weapons, including the ZSU-23-4 “Shylka.” The Soviet-era BM-21 “Grad” has been upgraded to a modern MAN (6×6) platform with improved targeting systems and crew protection.
Regarding small arms, considerable efforts have been made to equip troops with modern sniper systems from well-known global manufacturers, suitable for urban environments. There is also a transition from Kalashnikov rifles to modern models like the UAR-10 and UAR-15, replacing older assault and sniper rifles.
— What resources or capabilities does the National Guard lack the most?
— As long as active combat continues, no brigade or corps commander will say they have enough resources. Ammunition, artillery shells, and drones are used daily in large quantities. When the enemy intensifies operations in a given area, the need grows, and it’s impossible to claim resources are sufficient.
I believe the demand for drones will remain high in the near future. We see that the state leadership and our command are actively working to address this component.
Another critical need is artillery: long-range systems and artillery capable of operating in any weather and reinforcing difficult sections of the front. On some days, the enemy in areas under National Guard responsibility conducts 350 to 600 artillery strikes. Accordingly, our units carry out counter-battery operations, detect and destroy enemy artillery, and strike enemy positions. Drones are used extensively — for reconnaissance, strikes, and logistical tasks.
— What wears out National Guard soldiers the most today, and what helps them maintain resilience in such conditions?
— Our soldiers, like everyone, feel fatigue from constant involvement in combat — both physical and moral. At the same time, psychologists and commanders are at work, and there is a chaplain service, which helps soldiers stay motivated. Sometimes, soldiers who arrive in other Ukrainian cities say, “We see the support, and it gives us strength.”
People know what they are fighting for, see their families and citizens. Public trust in the National Guard is among the highest, and soldiers feel this. Humane treatment of service members helps them accomplish tasks even under difficult conditions, as everyone understands they are fighting for their country against a real enemy.
Recently, we launched a communication campaign with the slogan: “National Guard: People First,” and one of the taglines is “We get tired like everyone, but we fight for everyone.” This aptly captures how soldiers manage to carry out their missions despite fatigue and a prolonged war.
— THE ENEMY CONSTANTLY SPREADS DISINFORMATION
— As the National Guard spokesperson, what challenges do you face in strategic communications?
— The enemy has constantly, even during the ATO and Joint Forces Operation, attempted to spread disinformation. This work in the media space continues today, sometimes on a fairly large scale. In addition, there are cyber threats. We recall that before the full-scale invasion, there were major cyberattacks on government websites, including the National Guard of Ukraine’s site. Therefore, we also work to debunk Russian propaganda narratives, showcase the actions of our units on the battlefield, so that both international partners and Ukrainians can see the work carried out by the Defense Forces. This builds trust, support, and confidence that we have a strong army capable of defending the state.
— Which Russian information narratives do you have to fight most often?
— Russian propaganda traditionally actively spreads narratives about the “Azov” unit. This even had some consequences at the international level. However, the work carried out by the unit itself, along with our continuous communication, has shown that it is an effective component of the National Guard and Ukraine’s Defense Forces, defending its country. Other narratives target commanders — spreading information meant to demotivate personnel, or claims that a unit allegedly abandoned front-line positions or refused to carry out combat tasks. The enemy also produces fake stories about mobilization failures, mentioning the National Guard.
— How has Russian disinformation tactics regarding National Guard units changed over the past year?
— The tactics have essentially not changed. Russia has always devoted significant resources to propaganda and disinformation. Our countermeasures have strengthened considerably: through interagency coordination, work with media specialists, and cooperation with journalists, we quickly detect disinformation, provide clarifications, or debunk enemy narratives. The National Guard’s and Defense Forces’ communications work is now effective, as noted by our international partners, with whom we also coordinate on strategic communications.
— What skills help you in information warfare in the fifth year of the full-scale invasion? What should be strengthened or improved?
— It’s the collaboration of everyone working in communications and interagency coordination. Significant efforts are made to ensure that our communication and responses — from the National Security and Defense Council, Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and National Guard—are swift and effective. We clearly understand the agenda and threats, develop a unified voice policy, and determine at each stage who is responsible for what, so that all Defense Forces communications across the country are efficient.
IT IS ALWAYS NECESSARY TO HAVE TRAINED AND COMBAT-READY UNITS
— What lessons from this war are already changing the National Guard’s approach to combat operations?
— First, it is essential to understand that units must always be trained and combat-ready, with a large portion having real combat experience. This was clearly demonstrated in the battles for Hostomel Airport. At that time, our 4th brigade had been operating in the east — in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions—for an extended period. When a threat emerged, such as a Russian airborne operation, a single decision was made — to repel the attack. Soldiers knew how to act and performed quite effectively, considering the scale and suddenness of the offensive.
Second, constant work to ensure units are properly equipped with weapons, vehicles, and drones.
Third, the motivation of service members and the social support package. It is important that they feel adequately supported, know that their families are taken care of, and that the command communicates with them, understands their needs, and responds accordingly.
— Is the National Guard preparing for new types of threats that may emerge soon?
— The creation of the National Guard in 2014 was aimed at countering hybrid threats. Today, we face aerial strikes, information attacks, and kinetic combat operations on the battlefield, so we constantly analyze potential threats. There is significant experience across all areas, but the development of enemy weaponry, changes in their tactics, and the nature of battlefield operations naturally drive adjustments in the National Guard’s training and organizational structure.
— What tasks will the National Guard perform after the war?
— The National Guard of Ukraine is similar to equivalent structures worldwide, such as the French Gendarmerie, Romania’s Gendarmerie, and Portugal’s National Republican Guard. After hostilities cease, our tasks will include stabilization operations, maintaining law and order, participating in demining, and providing assistance to citizens in frontline and liberated territories. The National Guard has already carried out such tasks during the ATO and Joint Forces Operation, as well as in liberated areas of Kharkiv and Kherson regions.
The National Guard is a member of FIEP (the Association of Gendarmeries and Police Forces of Europe and the Mediterranean) and the European Gendarmerie Force. This demonstrates that our operations, tasks, and legal framework align with similar EU structures, all of which include a law enforcement component necessary for the security of the state and its citizens.
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