Rakhmanin explains Fedorov’s dismissal, unfinished reforms, mobilization challenges, and the tasks facing new defense leadership, warning against political simplifications and unresolved systemic problems.
The dismissal of Mykhailo Fedorov from the post of defense minister brought thousands of people into the streets demanding his return to the government. On Friday, July 31, the largest protest of the full-scale war took place.
Following his dismissal, Fedorov gave an extensive interview to Ukrainska Pravda, in which he said he does not consider his time in government to be over and is not in a hurry to burn bridges with the Presidential Office. The former minister also said he does not plan to join the protesters or call on them to disperse.
Could Fedorov return? What did he actually manage to change during his six months at the Ministry of Defense, and what remained at the level of plans, presentations, and promises? And what kind of legacy will the new leadership now have to deal with?
Ukrainska Pravda spoke about these issues with Serhii Rakhmanin, a member of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence, who, before entering parliament, spent nearly 30 years as one of Ukraine’s leading political journalists.
In this interview, we explore why Rakhmanin believes Fedorov’s dismissal was a mistake, what challenges acting Defense Minister Yevhen Khmara has inherited, whether the tandem of Khmara and the new Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapatyi can succeed, and who should now take responsibility for the army’s most painful issue — mobilization.
“Fedorov’s Dismissal Was a Mistake”
UP: At the height of the protests, you predicted the possible appointments of Yevhen Khmara and Mykhailo Drapatyi. Was that insider information or just a prediction?
Rakhmanin: I didn’t know. It was, if you like, a small intellectual exercise. Someone asked me, “What would you do if you were the president?” I replied that I have never been in that position and never will be, but judging by the situation the president had, one way or another, put himself in, the only viable compromise was to appoint as commander-in-chief and defense minister figures who were as broadly acceptable as possible—people who would provoke the fewest objections, reservations, or questions.
In my view, those people could have been Drapatyi and Khmara. Strangely enough, the prediction came true, although I don’t get them right very often. Forecasting is a rather thankless business.
UP: Former Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, unexpectedly for many of those supporting him at the mass protests, told Ukrainska Pravda that the story of his time in government and his relationship with the president is not over. Could he, in any way, return to the post of defense minister?
Rakhmanin: Before answering that, let me begin with a preface. Fedorov’s dismissal was a mistake, if only because six months is not enough time for someone to prove themselves. There were no well-founded reasons to remove him. He is a large-scale, systemic thinker and an enthusiast. At the same time, Mykhailo Albertovych made mistakes that he does not like to talk about. But he had the opportunity to accomplish much more, and the president deprived him of that opportunity.
If someone were to create a graphic novel about Ukraine’s modern political history, one chapter would be devoted to a cemetery of unrealized dreams and hopes. There would be an entire alley filled with the graves of people in whom enormous expectations had been placed, only for them to fall short. Every such unfulfilled hope caused disappointment for at least part of society—and in some cases, for the majority of Ukrainians.
That does not mean Fedorov would necessarily have become another such disappointment. My point is that over all these years we still have not learned to approach facts, events, and people with critical thinking. Instead, we tend to see history the way we want to see it, and under stressful circumstances it becomes even harder to let go of our illusions.
What I dislike most about this whole story is the attempt to paint it in black and white. Some people are excessively demonized, while others are excessively idealized. Life is far more complicated than that—it is certainly not black and white, especially when it comes to politics and political figures. And Mykhailo Fedorov is a political figure, even though he denies it.
Could he return? I don’t think so, for several reasons.
First, because of the president’s own personality. In my opinion, it is obvious to anyone who has observed him that he does not like admitting mistakes and does not like showing weakness.
Second, there are people advising him, and for certain reasons they are advising against such a move. The first reason is that, regardless of how people feel about Fedorov, Klymenko, who ultimately did not become defense minister, or Khmara, the appointment has already been made. Replacing a defense minister in a country at war is a major shock. A person has already been appointed. Even if only in an acting capacity, he has already begun dealing with an enormous number of difficult issues. Creating another upheaval would be an even greater problem and, in my firm belief, an even bigger mistake.
UP: When asked whether he viewed the government’s resignation as merely a cover for his own dismissal, Fedorov answered yes. Why did the president suddenly develop such an urgent need to remove him?
Rakhmanin: In my opinion, there could have been many reasons. Let me outline the main ones.
The first is that Mykhailo Albertovych had become too prominent in the media, and I doubt the president was pleased with that. Nearly all presidents in nearly all countries tend to view people they consider — rightly or wrongly — as potential rivals in this way. Volodymyr Oleksandrovych is an ambitious person with a particular attitude toward other public figures.
The second reason was the friction that had evolved into what was effectively an open conflict between Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi and the defense minister. In fact, it was not just a conflict between the two men, but between the institutions they led — between the commander-in-chief’s office, the General Staff, and the Ministry of Defense. Had it been merely a personal disagreement, it would have been one thing. But it was taking on unhealthy proportions.
Much depended on the president himself, so his claim that he simply had no time to deal with it is, in my view, unconvincing. Zelenskyy is a leader — both by temperament, regardless of how people feel about him, and by virtue of his office as head of state. It is precisely in times of crisis that leadership is demonstrated through the ability to calm tensions by every possible means. The president has an enormous range of tools at his disposal.
The misunderstandings and friction, which were increasingly resembling an open struggle, could not help but harm the Defense Forces, the national security sector, and the country’s overall defense capability. The situation had not yet reached a critical stage, but had it remained unresolved, it could have led to serious consequences.
The third reason, which both the president and the former defense minister have mentioned, is that one of the conditions for Fedorov’s appointment as defense minister was the implementation of mobilization reform. He accepted that responsibility. No matter how confidently Mykhailo Albertovych reported progress, in reality he accomplished nothing in this area, and what he calls a reform was not a reform at all.
UP: Are you referring to the new contracts Fedorov announced in May?
Rakhmanin: Not only those. What is a reform? It is a systemic, large-scale reorganization aimed at substantially — or even fundamentally — changing the rules of the game, with those changes enshrined in law. Which of Fedorov’s actions meets those criteria? The answer is: none. What he had was a patchwork of separate decisions and ideas that never moved beyond presentations and flowcharts.
Mobilization: Four Problems Without a Solution
UP: In his interview with Ukrainska Pravda, Fedorov said that a mobilization reform was due to be announced soon and was expected to take effect in September…
Rakhmanin: Mykhailo Albertovych Fedorov and his deputies, who repeatedly attended meetings of our committee, regularly assured us that the reform was just around the corner. The date for its supposedly definitive rollout was postponed at least three or four times. Could it have been introduced soon? Perhaps. But there was no guarantee it would not have been postponed for a fifth, sixth, or even seventh time.
UP: What specific reform are we talking about?
Rakhmanin: There has been a great deal of speculation and manipulation surrounding this issue, but the picture is not black and white. Those who blame Fedorov for the reform’s failure are wrong, but so is Fedorov when he says he did everything he possibly could.
First, reforming the Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centers (TCCs) was clearly not within the defense minister’s authority, because the TCCs, as military command bodies, report to the Ground Forces Command, which in turn reports to the General Staff. In other words, this was not his responsibility. But of his own accord, after making promises to the president, he decided to pursue the reform. He encountered resistance, faced pushback, the effort fell apart, and now he is being criticized for it as well.
In his interview with Ukrainska Pravda, Fedorov emphasized that he is not a politician. But a minister is, by definition, a political office. Mykhailo Fedorov became a politician the moment he was appointed minister of digital transformation, long before taking over the Ministry of Defense.
There is a 2014 government resolution titled “Regulations on the Ministry of Defense.” It states that the Ministry of Defense formulates and implements state policy. Not “building an ecosystem,” but policy. The document contains a lengthy list of policy areas, sectors, and responsibilities that fall under the ministry and the minister who heads it.
Policy is not just about approval ratings, public relations, or elections — those are only part of it. In those Regulations on the Ministry of Defense, the word “mobilization” appears at least fifteen times. Among other things, the document explicitly states that the Ministry of Defense is responsible for ensuring both mobilization and demobilization.
UP: Then why is the commander of the Ground Forces, who oversees the TCCs, largely unknown to the public, while Fedorov, who served as minister for only six months, is accused of having “failed the reform”?
Rakhmanin: Mobilization is a broad concept. Under the government resolution I mentioned, it is carried out in coordination with the Ministry of Economy, the commander-in-chief, the chief of the General Staff, the Cabinet of Ministers, and other institutions within the security and defense sector. No single person or agency can solve this enormous set of problems on its own, no matter how brilliant they may be. But it was certainly worth trying.
The mobilization issue consists of several distinct problems that have been discussed hundreds of times at dozens of meetings.
The first is the violation of citizens’ rights and freedoms by TCC personnel and police officers. There are cases of abuse of power, torture, and violations of fundamental rights committed by service members, and this damages both the state’s reputation and that of the Armed Forces in the eyes of the public. It creates a very negative atmosphere and a very poor backdrop for a country that, whether people like it or not, has no choice but to carry out mobilization. We simply cannot afford to abandon it.
The second problem is the corruption schemes that exist within the TCCs. The war has gradually become a classic war for the poor and for those who are not resourceful enough to avoid it. In our training centers, the recruits are predominantly people aged 55 and older — or at least over 50 — with various health problems, while young and healthy men somehow manage to avoid mobilization. The issue is not only the corruption itself, which is disgusting, wrong, and appalling, but also the fact that these corruption schemes directly affect the quality of what is now commonly called human capital. They prevent the Armed Forces from properly restoring the combat effectiveness of frontline units.
The third problem is unauthorized absence from military service (AWOL). A large number of people, for one reason or another, simply do not want to serve or are afraid. It is not for me to judge them, because I am not fighting myself. When they are mobilized, many of them go AWOL while still in the training center, while being transported from the training center to their unit, or within the first seven to ten days after arriving at the unit. This represents a critical number of personnel the Armed Forces ultimately lose. I know the exact figures, but I am not authorized to disclose them.
The fourth problem is the so-called draft evaders — people who avoid military service in various ways. We once had a meeting with the Khortytsia Operational and Strategic Group of Forces, which at the time was commanded by Mykhailo Drapatyi, and virtually all brigade and battalion commanders, without coordinating their views beforehand, spoke in favor of strengthening tougher measures, including restricting access to administrative services for those who evade mobilization…
UP: So, roughly speaking, about digital death?
Rakhmanin: Yes. Furthermore, there is another problem: these people are not being searched for. If they are searched for, they are not detained. If they are detained, authorities do not know what to do with them. If they know what to do with them, court cases take years to be considered. And even when they are considered, the decisions raise questions. In other words, it is a tangled web of issues that need answers.
Now I have a question: where are the proposals that have been formalized as draft laws? In six months, at least one draft law could have been submitted. Not presentations, not ideas — even brilliant ones — but an actual draft law. Because without legislation, none of this works.
What Fedorov and his team proposed does not solve a single one of these problems. A contract is a great thing. He or someone from his team said that the military were against it. The military were not against it; they were completely in favor. The only questions were where to find the money for it and, accordingly, how this would solve the AWOL problem.
If a person runs away from a training center, they do not care whether transfers are made more difficult or easier. They do not want to transfer anywhere because they do not want to serve. If someone is willing to pay 30, 35, or 40 thousand dollars in order not to serve, then even if the state pays them 7 thousand dollars, it will not convince them.
How can assigning mobilization functions to the National Police, which is already allowed under current law, change corruption schemes within the TCCs? Give me at least one example, at least one idea — I am not even asking for a government resolution or a draft law — that was submitted by Fedorov or his team.
Now the State Bureau of Investigation is conducting mass searches, arrests, and seizures of documents at TCCs. But this has already happened! For those who missed the beginning of the show, let me say: this has happened not once, not twice, not five times, and not ten times.
We pointed out to the minister and his team that some of the ideas they presented as their own had already been discussed many times before. Moreover, we explained that some things needed to be done through government resolutions, while others could only be done through laws — and not the other way around. We also explained that resolutions should be introduced to implement adopted laws, not the reverse.
“Fedorov Gave Hope, but Did Not Build a System”
UP: What did the ministry under Fedorov’s leadership manage to accomplish?
Rakhmanin: A small off-topic remark: it so happened that Denys Shmyhal, who, ironically, had also spent only six months in this position, was handing over the ministry to us, while Mykhailo Fedorov was taking over the post. Both of them ended up attending a meeting of our committee at the same time. Although this was not required by the procedure, they decided to listen to each other carefully. There was a sense of mutual respect and interest.
And I caught myself thinking that if it were possible to combine them, it would have been the ideal defense minister for our country during this extremely difficult period. Because Mykhailo Fedorov is a very visionary startup-type person, while Denys Shmyhal is a highly effective bureaucrat.
Bureaucracy is not a bad thing. It is good when bureaucracy does not slow things down but instead brings order to certain processes. And the Ministry of Defense is the largest, most complex, and most important ministry among all government institutions, especially now that we have dissolved the Ministry of Strategic Industries.
But it is impossible to combine two different people into one. Therefore, some of Fedorov’s very interesting, ambitious, and impressive ideas remained just startups. In some ways, he is right when he says that he is building a system and is not afraid of major challenges.
He liked being a minister of war, while he was actually the minister of defense. And the Ministry of Defense is about defense planning policy, military education, military science, supplies, and the entire defense-industrial complex.
Some areas under his responsibility were left hanging, while he focused his efforts on tasks that he personally considered to be higher priorities. For example, he really did try to simplify, and in some areas did simplify, certain processes related to supplying weapons, equipment, and specific materials to the Armed Forces.
UP: Drones?
Rakhmanin: Primarily drones, but not only drones.
If we talk, for example, about deep strikes, their scaling actually began under Shmyhal, but Fedorov invested heavily in expanding them and ensuring the uninterrupted supply of fiber-optic cables and fiber-optic drones, as well as medium-range strikes, which provided advantages in disrupting logistics and striking the enemy’s operational rear.
For any important cause, especially one as significant as resisting an enemy during a war, there must be hope. For many people, Fedorov embodied that hope. This was true both for those who were completely distant from military affairs and for some members of the military. By removing him without sufficient justification, people were deprived of that hope.
There were things that he genuinely did well and usefully, but it seems to me that he did not fully understand the scale of the task.
Without making unfounded criticism, I will give a simple example: the position of the General Staff and the commander-in-chief is that the creation of new brigades must continue, because this reflects the expansion of enemy formations and because it is necessary to have fully capable units that can replace one another and provide operational and strategic reserves.
Fedorov had a different view — he believed that it would be logical to conduct an audit of the brigades. We asked to see this audit, and we were surprised. Because the list of brigades that, according to this audit, were considered exemplary, so to speak, raised questions.
UP: Let me guess: these were the brigades that were the most fully staffed because they had not been conducting offensives, had not been involved in active defense, and were not deployed to the most difficult sections of the front?
Rakhmanin: Yes.
To Mykhailo Albertovych’s credit, he promised to review the criteria and acknowledged that his perspective had changed after that review.
Overall, he had some interesting ideas. For example, regarding mobilization, he also had some unconventional but, in their own way, interesting ideas about draft evaders. He never implemented them. Perhaps he postponed them for later. But for some reason, he does not refer to them now when defending his position.
I got the impression that the level of people who made up his team was insufficient to address the challenges facing the Ministry of Defense.
Fedorov believed that the General Staff’s position on procurement issues was not the ultimate truth. And he was right.
For example, he asked what the point was of purchasing so-called light artillery and small-caliber ammunition if artillery had become vulnerable and ineffective due to changes on the battlefield. He voiced this position repeatedly. Fedorov also pointed out that some types of UAVs were not in sufficient demand and that soldiers were trying to refuse them, yet for unknown reasons those types were still being ordered by the General Staff.
However, during Mykhailo Fedorov’s tenure, those drones that the military were refusing were still being purchased. The nature of these procurements, I will put it very delicately, did not correspond to Fedorov’s own public statements.
When we asked the Ministry of Defense reasonable and well-founded questions, we did not receive a sensible or clear answer.
“Khmara Will Have to Address the Army’s Salary Issues and Fuel Shortages”
UP: The new head of the Ministry of Defense, Yevhen Khmara, may become the minister with the lowest public expectations. The six defense ministers who served during the war were expected to achieve extraordinary results, and Fedorov perhaps faced the highest expectations of all. What challenges will Khmara face?
Rakhmanin: His success will depend on three things: the level of trust from the supreme commander-in-chief, freedom in making personnel decisions, and how quickly he can prioritize the problems that need to be addressed.
He has inherited serious financial problems from his predecessors.
UP: Are you referring to the money for army salaries?
Rakhmanin: Since Fedorov spoke about this publicly, we can refer to some facts. He took a risk and used funds allocated for military salaries to purchase unmanned aerial vehicles in order to ensure uninterrupted supplies and create a certain reserve of drones for their effective use.
The lion’s share of defense spending goes toward personnel payments. Closing this gap will be Khmara’s responsibility. There are also problems with food supply contracts and fuel reserves. In addition to the issues that are passed down from one minister to another — the TCCs and mobilization. Neither Reznikov, nor Umerov, nor Fedorov were able to resolve them. Although Reznikov probably encountered them the least.
These are problems that must be addressed by the entire state, and the leader of this process must be the president. Without him, none of this will move forward, let alone take off.
UP: Is it true that Yevhen Khmara learned about his possible appointment as defense minister on the same day that the president announced his appointment?
Rakhmanin: I do not know for certain, but if that is true, I am not surprised. It is not the first and not the last such case. This is our personnel management trend.
UP: Khmara’s brainchild — “Alpha” — is one of the leaders in the field of drones, and they are associated with some of the most successful long-range strikes. Will he be, so to speak, a “drone minister”?
Rakhmanin: For many people, the commander of “Alpha” is simply a combatant, a special forces operative. But for some reason, it was this very person who was appointed to the difficult position of acting head of the Security Service of Ukraine, and after that, this same person was appointed acting minister. Obviously, it was not only because of his combat achievements, which certainly exist, but also because of his thoughtfulness, prudence, and, if you will, flexibility.
The distinctive feature of their use of unmanned aviation was that they worked with manufacturers in a thoughtful and very effective way, and approached the tactics of deployment and the analysis of operations in a systematic manner. In other words, he is also a systemic thinker.
UP: Given that the formal reason for the dismissal of the defense minister and the commander-in-chief was the conflict between them, what can be said about the potential of the Khmara–Drapatyi tandem?
Rakhmanin: They have a normal working relationship and normal relations. Now those relations will be tested by their new positions — and that is always a challenge.
For those who do not know, relations between the defense minister and the commander-in-chief are never completely smooth — they can range from routine professional friction to open conflicts. The classic, almost caricature-like example of such relations was the one between Khomchak and Taran. The most harmonious relationship was between Reznikov and Zaluzhnyi. But these are always complicated interactions.
Both Drapatyi and Khmara are quite level-headed. However, neither of them prepared for these positions, and that is a disadvantage.
UP: Is it really true that Drapatyi was not prepared either? Fedorov came into office with a plan to appoint him.
Rakhmanin: Despite the fact that he had long been considered a potential commander-in-chief, over the past year he did not expect it to happen in the foreseeable future — Fedorov’s proposal was rejected.
The idea of offering him this position emerged reactively, so to speak. Therefore, it is not a story of him having spent a long time preparing for it or developing plans in advance. As far as I know, his plans were somewhat different.
Mykhailo Vasylovych was not on the short list of potential commanders-in-chief. He was the “first reserve option,” which he certainly knew about.
So psychologically, on the one hand, he wanted this position and deserved it, but he did not expect to receive it.
There is another point that Valerii Zaluzhnyi hinted at when congratulating Drapatyi: it will be harder for him than it may seem. Just like the defense minister, the commander-in-chief is a political position. Whether both Khmara and Drapatyi are ready for that, I do not know.
Politics, among other things, means the ability to argue, defend your point of view, and insist on it even when communicating with the president.
It also means the ability to avoid unnecessary influence and the harmful pressure of the huge number of people who immediately appear around you.
This is a tremendous challenge that not everyone is capable of handling. Without political experience in the broadest sense of the word, it is possible to make mistakes that one will ultimately have to pay for personally.
UP: Syrskyi’s dismissal was effectively a demand from society. The demand from society toward Drapatyi is to deal with the issue of assault regiments, which were referred to as Syrskyi’s regiments. How do you predict he will act?
Rakhmanin: Drapatyi does not owe society anything. He must solve the problems of a country’s army at war. And he should approach the issue of assault regiments from a military perspective.
UP: Who will be appointed responsible for mobilization?
Rakhmanin: The president must be responsible. And the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Defense, demographers, psychologists, media professionals, and human rights advocates should all be involved, carefully selected, placed in one room, and not allowed to leave until they develop at least some draft version. Not something that can simply be announced on television or at a press conference, but something that can actually be implemented through laws — at least fifteen of them — with corresponding amendments to other laws, regulations, and draft government resolutions.
The situation we are living in is existential: either we do not lose, or we cease to exist. The question remains exactly that, which is why we cannot afford not to solve the mobilization problem in at least some way.
Tags: EMPR media Fedorov military reform Russia-Ukraine War TCC Reform Ukraine defense Ukraine Mobilization
