Russia’s War Trap: Why Ending the War Risks Collapse

Russia’s leadership no longer has a viable exit from the war that does not risk destabilizing the system itself. The economy is under strain, the battlefield situation remains costly, and relations with allies are increasingly fragile. Even a freeze of the war would not resolve these pressures.

First, a rough estimate: how many Russians today are directly or indirectly tied to the war economy?

The size of the armed forces is roughly 1.5 million personnel, with around 700,000 deployed in combat zones. Add to this the National Guard (approximately 340,000), as well as the FSB, FSO, and penitentiary services—bringing the total number of security personnel to roughly 2.5 million.

Around 3.5 million people are directly employed in the defense-industrial complex. Adjacent sectors—metallurgy (steel, titanium, aluminum), chemicals (propellants, explosives, composites), electronics (components used in weapons systems), general engineering, logistics, and transport—add another estimated 2–3 million jobs largely tied to military demand. Wages in defense industries have surged, drawing workers away from civilian sectors.

Add the state administrative apparatus, state media, pro-war commentators, and organizations involved in mobilization and fundraising—amounting to several hundred thousand more.

Then there are families. Mobilized soldiers and contract servicemen often support spouses, children, and parents through elevated wartime incomes: enlistment bonuses, monthly salaries significantly above regional averages, and compensation payments. In total, an estimated 15–20 million Russians derive a significant portion of their income from the war economy.

What happens if the war ends abruptly?

Problem #1: Economic shock.
Military spending currently accounts for an estimated 7–8% of GDP officially, and potentially 10–12% in reality. A sudden reduction would ripple through production chains. For example: a sharp drop in tank orders leads to layoffs, reduced demand for steel and electronics, falling regional incomes, and declining tax revenues. This is a classic post-war demobilization recession, seen historically in multiple countries.

Problem #2: Return of soldiers.
Roughly 1.5 million individuals have passed through the war in various capacities. Many would return home to limited employment prospects and lower wages. Large numbers of trained and potentially disillusioned veterans could create long-term social and security challenges.

Problem #3: Ideological strain.
The war has not delivered the rapid outcomes initially anticipated. Ukraine remains independent and has strengthened its capabilities, while Russia has incurred substantial costs. This raises difficult questions within society about the purpose and outcomes of the conflict.

Problem #4: Elite fragmentation.
The war has produced new stakeholders—military figures, defense contractors, and influential commentators—whose interests are tied to continued spending and status. A reduction in war activity could create tensions within elite groups.

Problem #5: Regional imbalance.
Wartime payments have redistributed income to poorer regions. A sudden halt would remove this financial flow, potentially widening regional disparities again.

All of this unfolds amid ongoing sanctions, technological constraints, demographic pressures, and growing societal fatigue. The longer the war continues, the more complex any exit becomes. Yet continuation carries its own escalating risks.

EMPR