GUR Major General Vadym Skibitskyi discusses Russia’s war plans, possible mobilization, threats from the north, strikes on Ukraine, and the impact of Ukrainian deepstrike operations.
Moscow continues its offensive operations and is intensifying attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. At the same time, the key question for the Kremlin in the coming months is whether it will have enough troops to carry out its plans and achieve its objectives.
What Putin is planning on the battlefield, which facilities are at risk of attacks in the autumn and winter, whether there is a threat of an offensive from the north, and whether a new mobilization in Russia is possible — in the second part of RBC-Ukraine’s interview with Deputy Chief of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, Major General Vadym Skibitskyi. The first part is available here.
Key points:
Ceasefire. There are no signs on the battlefield that Russia is ready to cease fire and begin negotiations. Russia does not plan to reach an agreement or sign a peace deal by the end of the year.
Autumn-Winter Strike Campaign. Russia will continue striking the defence industry, military facilities, energy infrastructure, logistics facilities and gas stations. In winter, electricity and heating will remain the most vulnerable sectors, while gas infrastructure will also be at risk.
Mobilization in Russia. The Defence Intelligence of Ukraine does not rule out that Putin could launch a new wave of mobilization after the elections. Given the heavy losses, without mobilization Russia cannot form new military units, including turning existing brigades into divisions.
Offensive from the North. Theoretically, Russia could launch offensive operations from the north this year. However, there are currently neither the conditions nor indicators of preparations for such an operation, nor the troops required for it. If Russia carries out mobilization, it could form a strike force by around February, at the beginning of next year.
Manpower problems. Russian army losses already exceed the monthly number of contract recruits. In July alone, there were at least 40,000 killed and wounded, while around 39,000 people signed military contracts.
On the battlefield, Russia is not currently showing any signs that it intends to stop the war. On the contrary, Moscow is intensifying its strikes and continuing offensive operations in an attempt to make progress toward its objectives by the end of the year.
We discussed the current tactics of Russian attacks and their arsenal of weapons — missiles and strike drones — in the first part of our interview with Deputy Chief of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, Major General Vadym Skibitskyi.
In this part, we discuss what Putin wants to achieve by the end of the year, whether there will be a new mobilization in Russia, how real the threat of an offensive from the north is, and how Ukrainian strikes on the Russian rear are affecting the enemy.
– The other day, Presidential Office adviser Mykhailo Podolyak said that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was offering Putin an air ceasefire, an end to strikes on energy infrastructure, a freeze of the war along the front line, and the start of difficult negotiations, and that he was also ready to meet. The president has also spoken about this in various speeches and statements. What do intelligence assessments say about Moscow’s intentions?
– Analysts at the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine base their assessment on the fact that there are no signs on the battlefield indicating that Russia is ready to cease fire and begin meaningful negotiations. Their plans are clear, and this is what they are saying: there will be no agreements or peace deal signed by the end of this year.
Putin wants to achieve the goals he has set for himself — primarily in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Their General Staff’s plans are to complete the capture of Donetsk region by the end of this year.
– What should we prepare for in terms of strikes in the autumn and winter? What could Russia’s tactics look like, and which targets will they focus on?
– According to military intelligence, the targets will remain the same — the defence industry, military facilities, energy infrastructure, logistics systems, and gas stations. As we can see now, they are striking not only military but also civilian targets. In winter, our most vulnerable areas are electricity and heating, so they could also come under attack.
For example, not long ago, the Russians developed a drone designed to strike power poles and transmission lines. It carries an explosive element in its wings capable of cutting through metal.
We draw our conclusions from analyzing the enemy’s intelligence activities on our territory, including the use of satellites that conduct reconnaissance of critical infrastructure facilities across Ukraine.
Deputy Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal recently warned about risks to the water supply, and such a threat does exist. This is one of the critical areas.
In addition, our gas transmission system and gas production facilities in the Poltava and Kharkiv regions could once again come under threat in the autumn and winter, as the enemy has already attacked them in the past.
– What about the bridges across the Dnipro? Are they among their targets?
– They are also critical infrastructure, which is why we understand how important it is for Ukraine’s military intelligence to obtain advance information about the aggressor’s plans in this area.
Recently, Russian forces have been striking bridges in the frontline regions — in Sumy, Kharkiv and Chernihiv regions. They are systematically attacking critical bridges in Zatoka and Maiaky, which are very important elements of our transportation system. When a facility becomes most critical to us, that is when the enemy begins targeting it.
– Does the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine see any signs that Russia is preparing for a new offensive operation from the north, either in Chernihiv or Kyiv regions?
– It will depend on mobilization in Russia, and we will only know whether there will be mobilization after the elections. Indicators and intelligence signs of mobilization efforts will emerge; it is impossible to carry out a covert mobilization nowadays. However, the enemy is ready for it one way or another, as Putin’s decree from 2022 is still in force.
Before the elections, they will try to demonstrate some gains in those areas of the front where they are capable of making progress. After that, there may be a mobilization.
– So, is an offensive toward Kyiv or Chernihiv regions possible this year?
– The Russians have experience conducting such mobilization, and we understand how it works. They launched a partial mobilization in the second half of October 2022. The combat units that could actually enter the fighting were at the front by January 2023, with some arriving as early as December.
Let’s remember when they launched their offensive on Kyiv — February 24, 2022.
So, if the aggressor launches a new wave of mobilization this year, they could prepare a powerful strike force by around February, at the beginning of next year. And this does not rule out the possibility that the Russian command could launch such an operation in February, knowing Putin’s fondness for symbolic dates.
However, these timelines will depend on how many people they mobilize and whether there will be mobilization at all.
Could the enemy launch offensive operations from the north this year? Theoretically, yes, but in practice there are no conditions or indicators showing that they are ready for such an operation, and they do not have the troops required for it.
According to the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, the enemy’s military losses currently exceed the monthly number of contract recruits. For example, their total losses in June stood at around 39,000, of whom about 60% were killed or missing. In July, the losses amounted to at least 40,000 killed and wounded. At the same time, 36,000 people signed contracts with Russia’s Ministry of Defence in June, and around 39,000 did so in July.
– How large is the Russian force fighting against Ukraine?
– It consists of 670,000 troops in the combat component and 65,000 personnel in the operational reserve. This figure has remained almost unchanged.
– So, one way or another, do they need mobilization?
– Without mobilization, they cannot form new military units. The Russian command plans to form divisions based on existing combat brigades, but there is not enough personnel to do so.
The Russians have also encountered problems staffing their unmanned systems forces. Their military command assumed that all the students would rush to join them, but in reality, they have achieved only 30% of their recruitment target for the Unmanned Systems Forces. They are trying to draw personnel from other branches and services of the military, but overall, recruitment is falling short.
According to military intelligence, Moscow has set a target of recruiting 409,000 people this year. At the same time, Putin approved a law reducing the list of crimes that bar people from signing contracts to fight in the war.
Essentially, the restrictions now apply only to “traitors to the motherland,” pedophiles and people convicted of political crimes. Everyone else — murderers, rapists, members of organized crime groups and drug traffickers — can sign contracts. So far, 28,000 people from these categories have already signed contracts.
And, as a rule, the Russians increase their recruitment targets for contract soldiers in the second half of the year. Recruitment has dipped somewhat at the moment — it is at around 98% of the target, but this is the number of people who have signed contracts voluntarily.
– If there is mobilization, will it also be voluntary rather than forced?
– There is no democracy there. Everyone will go into the army — you’ll see.
– How are our middle- and deep-strike attacks affecting Russia?
– What does the Putin regime fear right now? Our deep strikes rank second among the issues that concern the Russian population the most. The number one concern is their standard of living. And that’s not even taking into account how our attacks on Russian oil refineries have reduced government and big-business revenues. They now also have a problem with how to export crude oil.
When our deep strikes ranked second in opinion polls, it demonstrated their real impact.
As for middle strikes, they are disrupting the entire logistics network in Crimea and the occupied territories in the south. GUR units are destroying the assets that previously prevented us from carrying out precision strikes against enemy military targets — for example, Russian radar systems, air defence systems, and elements of the military command-and-control and weapons systems. Under our current conditions, this is one of the most effective ways to counter a powerful adversary such as Russia.
– What military threats from Russia to NATO countries does the GUR consider the most realistic, and over what time frame?
– At present, we consider the so-called asymmetric threats — hybrid operations — to be the most realistic. Since spring, Alliance countries have been dealing with unidentified drones. Romania and Poland have at least begun shooting down these targets. Now, narratives aimed at discrediting “NATO” weapons are spreading in the information space.
In addition, political movements and civic organizations loyal to Moscow are gaining momentum there.
These are all hybrid measures carried out by Russia. But if we look at theory and history, such measures usually precede military action. In other words, this is one of the indicators that may point to preparations for a conflict.
Russia’s plans envision being ready for a war with NATO countries by 2030. The Alliance has also openly stated that by 2030, Russia will be capable of conducting more active military operations against NATO member states. That is why NATO countries are adjusting their budgets, conducting combat training, expanding defence industry capabilities, and holding exercises aimed at preparing for a military conflict with Russia using modern approaches.
Tags: GUR Ukraine Northern Offensive Russia Mobilization Russia NATO threat Russia War Plans Ukrainian Deep Strikes Vadym Skibitskyi
